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A report from Holland}
where lithe most significant arbitration
body in history}} has
devoted 16 years to
mediating legal
matters between two
hostile nations: the
United States and the
Republic of Iran.
Recent diplomatic overtures made
to the United States by Iran's president Mohammed Khatami were
front-page news, but when I tel1 people, even right here in The Hague,
that I'm a legal advisor at the IranUnited States Claims 'Itibunal,
most ofthem reply that
they've heard about "the war
crimes courts or the court at
the Peace Palace." I explain that,
no, the Claims 'Itibunal isn't the
International Court of Justice,
or the International Criminal
'Itibunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Rather, it's an international
arbitral tribunal established in 1981
as part of the settlement to free the
52 Americans taken hostage in Iran
in 1979.
It's not surprising that many people
have never heard of the Claims
'Itibunal. It carries on its proceedings in relative obscurity, in an
1"3
inconspicuous former hotel in
this sleepy, diplomat-heavy
~4
Dutch city. But though its physical surroundings are modest,
"II
its success isn't: the 'Itibunal
has been described as "the most
significant arbitral body in history,"
and for 16 years it has brought together lawyers and judges from two decidedly hostile nations to discuss
complex legal questions in an exceptionally delicate political context.
The 'Itibunal has managed to sidestep
hundreds oflegal and political problems to stay on course, resolve claim
after claim, and have, I believe, a significant effect on the development of
public international law.
Nearly two decades after the
hostage crisis, it may be hard to remember that for 30 years before the
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1979 incident, Iran and America
were the closest of al1ies. During
those years, Iran experienced enormous economic and military growth,
spurred by increased oil revenues,
and the Shah, wishing to industrialize
Iran's growing economy, turned to
Western - especial1y American technology, equipment, advisors, and
investment. American companies
and the American military were
more than happy to provide such
help, and by the late 1970s, Iran was
home to many American business interests, ranging from constrnction
projects to off-shore oil drilling to
product lines like Pepsi-Cola and
Revlon. The American government,
seeking to obtain a secure foothold in
the Persian Gulf, also supplied Iran
with vast quantities of military hardware. By the late 1970s, hundreds of
American corporations were involved in lucrative Iranian projects,
and tens of thousands of American
citizens were living in Iran.
But during that same period, antiWestern sentiment began to gain
force in Iran. Although the Shah had
promised for many years to lift his
people from poverty, his promises
were largely unfulfilled, and substantial segments ofthe population had
difficulty meeting basic needs. While
poor Iranian families, three generations strong, crowded into miserable,
dilapidated apartments in South
Thhran, Americans and wealthy
Iranians lived luxuriously in the treeshaded foothills of North Thhran.
Many Iranians not only believed the
Westerners to be exploiting their
country's economic resources, but
they also thought the Americans and
their col1eagues were, without much
thought or sensitivity, imposing Western values and culture on Iran.
These were the seeds of a revolution, and it began in 1978, with violent strikes and demonstrations
against the government. By late
December 1978, most American businesses in Iran were so disrnpted tl1at
they felt compel1ed to suspend activities and to bring expatriates home.
The Shah fled the countly in January
1979, the Ayatol1ah Khomeini took
power in Febrnary, and soon after
the new Islamic Republic ofIran
began instituting its reforms. The
new government wasted no time in
breaching contracts with American
companies and in expropriating com-
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panies, especially those owned by
American investors or Westernized
Iranians perceived to be allies of the
Shah. The government also formally
nationalized certain industries, including banking and insurance, and
de facto nationalized the petroleum
industry.
On Nov:ember 4, 1979, the United
States Embassy was seized and 52
Americans held hostage. Readers old
enough to remember the hostage crisis will remember the seeming hopelessness of resolution, as Iran seized
its chance to defy "the Great Satan,"
the United States, on a world stage.
Frustrated, President Jimmy Carter
ordered an ill-fated military rescue attempt. On the night of April 24, 1980,
eight Sea Stallion RH-53D helicopters
lifted off from the aircraft carrier
Nimitz. They were supposed to fly to
a remote landing strip 275 miles from
Tehran; rendezvous with six C-130
Hercules transport planes carrying
commandos, vans, and trucks; and
then storm the American Embassy
and rescue the hostages. But the helicopters met with a sandstorm that
disabled two ofthem. One then
crashed into one ofthe C-130s. Both
aircraft burst into flames, eight
servicemen died, the hostages remained hostage, and American hopes
plummeted.

release ofthe hostages; much of the
money had been judicially attached,
and simply returning the money
would have been perceived in America as selling out American litigants.
The solution: the establishment of
the Iran-United States Claims TI:ibuna1. Representatives ofIran and
the United States never met face-toface, but they conducted intense
negotiations through Algerian intermediaries during the last months of
1980. On January 19,1981, the countries agreed to the 'l\lgiers Declarations," which stated that the hostages
would be released, most ofIran's assets would be returned to Iran, and
an international arbitral tribunal
would be established in The Hague to
adjudicate, among other things, the
claims of American litigants against
Iran. It should be noted that not all of
Iran's assets were returned; the
Declarations required that $1 billion
be transferred to a security account
that would be used to pay the awards

Not surprisingly, some American litigants sued the United States government, alleging, among other things,
that by requiring them to cease litigation in American courts and to bring
their claims before the TI:ibunal, the
government had effected an unconstitutional taking of their property.
This bid was rejected by the U.S.
Supreme Court, which recognized
precedents upholding the President's
authority to settle claims of United
States nationals, and which was no
doubt aware ofthe difficult position
in which the President had been
placed.

that the TI:ibunal issued against Iran.
The declarations also required Iran to
replenish the account when it dipped
below $500,000. The Declarations
provided that the TI:ibunal would be
composed of nine arbitrators: three
appointed by the United States, three
appointed by Iran, and three appointed by both countries together, or by
an appointing authority ifthe countries could not agree. Litigation in the
United States was suspended, and
American litigants were told to bring
their claims before the 'Ihbuna1.
The return ofthe American
hostages led to great euphoria in the
United States, but the American litigants who had brought suit against
Iran in American courts were not as
delighted; they would have to travel
to The Hague to adjudicate their
claims before an untested arbitral
body applying who-knew-what law.

requested extensions oftime for filing its briefs, extensions that were
routinely granted. One American arbitrator, Judge Brower, acidly complained that the TI:ibunal had "been
moving at a speed calculated to inspire professional envy in sloth and
snail alike." Further, the Americans
suspected from the outset that the
Iranian arbitrators were appointed
simply to rule for Iran, and it was
commonly thought that Iranian arbitrators deliberately delayed proceedings by making themselves unavailable for deliberations (one Iranian arbitrator, for example, vanished on a
sudden five-week vacation at a key
moment), and refusing to sign certain awards made by the TI:ibuna1.
The Iranians, on the other hand,
were convinced that the TI:ibunal was
too "Western" to be fair, and they suspected that the six non-Iranian arbi-

So

the TI:ibunal began. Litigants
had a year to file their claims, and
3,816 claims were filed before the
deadline. Howevel; this rush of activity from the claimants went unmatched by the TI:ibunal itself.
The American litigants and arbitrators early and often charged Iran
with egregious stalling. Iran routinely

Yet

Carter had, all this time, a quieter weapon, one that would eventually prove to be the key to resolving
the crisis. When the American Embassy was seized in 1979, Carter immediately froze Iranian assets in the
United States and in American financial institutions abroad - assets totalling $12 billion. That money was of
great interest, of course, to the American companies that had lost property
or had contracts breached by the new
Iranian government, and the American companies filed suit in American
courts, seeking recompense for their
losses. Many ofthe claims proceeded
to judgment, and Iranian assets to
pay these judgments were judicially
attached.
So, by the autumn ofl980, when
Iran and the United States began to
negotiate in earnest to resolve the
hostage crisis, it was clear that each
side had something the other wanted.
The United States wanted its hostages
released, and wanted them freed
without having to pay ransom for
them. Iran wanted its money back,
and wanted to get out from under
what it viewed as burdensome litigation before American judges. The
United States, howeveI; could not
simply return Iran's money upon the
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trators were biased against Iran. They
were already opposed to a Swedish
arbitrator, Judge Mangard, who had
allegedly condemned executions
(thereby "prejudging Iran's political
system," according to the Iranians),
and their overall frustration turned to
fury in 1984 when the 1hbunal ruled
that Iranians who had left the country and obtained American citizenship could apply to the 1hbunal for
redress. In the wake ofthat ruling,
Iran's Prime Minister at the time, Mr.
Musavi, accused the 1tibunal of succumbing to pressure from "the Great
Satan, America," and threatened boycotts of sessions. The Iranian arbitrators categorized the llibunal's awards
as a "manifestation of the work of a
degenerated system," and charged
further that "the llibunal, with its
predominantly Western composition,
has in every respect betrayed the
trust vested in it." Finally, on September 3,1984, as the Swedish judge,
Mangard, was walking toward a meeting room, two Iranian arbitrators
Judges Kashani and Shafeiei - physically attacked him, punching him,
yanking on his tie, and shoving him
out the front door ofthe 1tibunal.
That disturbance was quelled, but
Kashani said that if "Mangard ever
dares to enter the 1tibunal chamber
again, either his corpse or my corpse
will leave it rolling down the stairs,"
and Mangard, urged to stay home by
his colleagues, did, and so was placed
under virtual house arrest.
Not surprisingly, proceedings at
the llibunal came to a virtual standstill, and many wondered ifthis innovative experiment in cross-cultural
justice had come to an end. Indeed,
Judge Shafeiei later said that he and
Judge Kashani had planned the attack on Judge Mangard in the hopes
of putting pressure on the Iranian
Government to withdraw from the
1tibunal. But Iran apparently decided
that it had too much at stake in the
1tibunal to abandon it, and the 1tibunal persevered. Iran decided of its
own accord to replace the offending
arbitrators, and the 1tibunal resumed
its work. Although the attack on
Judge Mangard brought the TIibunal
to the brink of collapse, it was also a
turning point. The 1tibunal that resumed work was a stronger, more
confident institution, no longer afraid
that Iran would withdraw from the
agreement, and both nations renewed their commitment to make
the institution work.
Since then the 1tibunal has carried
on, largely out ofthe public eye,
slowly resolving the claims brought

before it. I do not suggest that all of
the llibunal's problems have disappeared. Proceedings sometimes
move at what Americans at home
would consider a sick snail's pace,
briefings in cases routinely drag on
for three or more years, and the
preparation of a written opinion,
once a hearing has finally been held,
can take another two years, as the issues are hashed out by the arbitrators
again and again, and opinions revised
ad infinitum. Indeed, the 1tibunal has
still not held hearings in a handful of
cases that were filed before the January 19,1982 deadline. And the 1tibunal shares with all judicial systems
the plague of claimants who are willing to perjure themselves for gain.
The Government ofIran has often
maintained that the security account
beckons to thieves as if it were a pot
of gold, and that characterization has
at times seemed apt. In one case, for
example, an American named
Gordon Williams filed suit at the llibunal, claiming that certain government-controlled Iranian banks had
failed to honor two letters of credit
that had been opened in favor of his
company. The 1tibunal concluded
that Williams was entitled to
$300,000, plus interest from 1980.
The Algerian Central Bank, as escrow
agent, forwarded the money to the
Federal Reserve Bank in New York to
be paid to Ml: Williams. At that point
the Fed discovered that there were
competing Gordon Williamses,
conspirators who turned out to be
Iranian nationals using the birth certificate of a deceased American.

But

despite some delay and chicanery, the 1tibunal is a stunning
and surprising success: It has decided
more than 3,900 cases in 16 years
and awarded nearly $3 billion to U.S.
claimants. And from ajurisprudential standpoint, the 1tibunal is the
largest and most important arbitral
institution ever instituted in international relations, and its decisions
"constitute perhaps the greatest single source of jurisprudential development of public international law in
history," according to former American arbitrator Charles Browser.
The 1tibunal is influential primarily
for two reasons: first, its decisions are
public, which is unprecedented in international arbitration; and second,
its decisions cover an enormous
range ofinternational business transactions, and so serve as precedent on
a wide variety of subjects. The 1tibunal's most notable jurisprudential
contribution is in the law of expropriation, but it also has rendered signifiSpring 1998
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cant decisions in treaty interpretation and the nationality of claims,
among other areas.
Why has the 1tibunal been successful?
One, it has persisted; clearly both
countries have continued to participate in (and fund!) the 1tibunal because they believe it to be in their
best interest to do so. American
claimants have clearly benefited, and
Iran has brought suit seeking billions
of dollars for alleged breaches of contract for military equipment.
TWo, it has carefully combined
principle and pragmatism. It has not
allowed itself to be cowed by threats
or obstructionistic behavior, but it
also has handled matters flexibly and
diplomatically. The 1tibunal has
often gone out of its way to avoid calling attention to obvious misbehavior
or to avoid deciding politically explosive issues. This can be frustrating,
especially to Americans who believe
in "tellin' it like it is," but such forbearance has paid great dividends.
Finally, the 1tibunal provides
direct access between two governments that have no formal diplomatic
relations. This ability to communicate informally is of great value. It
was especially useful recently when
Washington and Thhran negotiated a
$61.8 million settlement for Iran's
claim against the United States over
the 1988 "Airbus incident." The U.S.S.
Vincennes shot down an Iran Air A300 Airbus over the Persian Gulfthat
year, and Iran's claim against the
United States as a result of the incident had been before the highvisibility International Court of Justice for years. Fortunately for all, the
parties were able to settle the matter
quietly and relatively quickly in the
1tibunal.
So, while presidents elsewhere
trade statements, here in an inconspicuous former hotel, without the
grandeur of the Peace Palace, without
the heavy international press coverage afforded the War Crimes TIibunal, the Iran-United States Claims
TI-ibunal proceeds with its cases. Although it is sometimes inefficient
and sometimes motivated as much
by politics as by law, it is notable as a
place where words, not bullets and
bombs, continue to be exchanged between hostile nations. Flaws and all,
the 1tibunal is something eminently
worth talking about. 0
Nancy Amoury Combs '91 has served
as a law clerk for U. S. Supreme Court
Justice Anthony Kennedy, and concludes her tenn with the 'Dibunal in
The Hague in October of 1999.

